GENDER AND THE SOCIAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP: 
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
GENDER RELATIONS AND WELFARE STATES

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State social provision affects women's material situations, shapes gender relationships, structures political conflict and participation, and contributes to the formation and mobilization of identities and interests. Mainstream comparative research has neglected gender, while most feminist research on the welfare state has not been systematically comparative. I develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the gender content of social provision that draws on feminist and mainstream work. Three dimensions of qualitative variation suggested by power resources analysts are reconstructed to incorporate gender: (1) the state-market relations dimension is extended to consider the ways countries organize the provision of welfare through families as well as through states and markets; it is then termed the state-market-family relations dimension; (2) the stratification dimension is expanded to consider the effects of social provision by the state on gender relations, especially the treatment of paid and unpaid labor; (3) the social citizenship rights/decommodification dimension is criticized for implicit assumptions about the sexual division of caring and domestic labor and for ignoring the differential effects on men and women of benefits that decommodify labor. Two additional dimensions are proposed to capture the effects of state social provision on gender relations: access to paid work and capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household.

No one who has listened to debates about the welfare state in the United States or in other advanced capitalist and democratic countries — about "welfare mothers" or childcare support — could doubt the importance of

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1 Using the term "welfare state" to describe modern state social provision may be misleading because it assumes what must be proved — that states promote the welfare of their citizens through social policy — and also because it assumes that a commitment to public social provision, once established, is irreversible. Generally, the welfare state is conceptualized as a state committed to modifying the play of social or market forces in order to achieve greater equality (Ruggie 1984, p. 11). The welfare state is often operationalized as the collection of social insurance and assistance programs that offer income protection to victims of unemployment.
relationships, structures political conflict and participation, and contributes to the formation and mobilization of specific identities and interests. Many would also argue — and I would agree — that, as a result of varied political struggles, the state may also offer important political resources to women and to other subordinate groups. Moreover, variation across countries and over time in the character and effects of social provision on gender relations has been considerable and significant.

Recent feminist work on social provision is concerned with the extent to which welfare states have the potential to be or already are “woman-friendly” (Herres 1987), or, to pose the proposition somewhat differently, the extent to which — and how — they reproduce male dominance. Some analysts have highlighted the role of women’s political agency in securing social rights based simply on citizenship. The recognition of the gendered characters of the welfare state and social politics, and of the agency of women, are important corrective to the “mainstream” literature on the welfare state, which is all too often gender-blind in its conceptions of class, citizenship and the economy. Yet if little of the mainstream comparative research on the welfare state has considered gender relations, most feminist research on the welfare state has not been comparative. Thus, not enough is known about how and to what extent systems of social provision actually do vary in their gender content, how social provision and other state institutions affect gender relations, and how the state’s impact on gender relations is related to its effects on other social relations.

Conversations between mainstream welfare state researchers and feminist researchers would benefit both groups, yet there have been too few structured confrontations of conceptual frameworks and empirical findings across the two bodies of scholarship. Mutual appreciation has been hampered by the different analytic strategies pursued by feminist and mainstream scholars. Until recently, most feminist empirical analyses of the welfare state have been case studies and have not engaged the conceptual frameworks and empirical findings of the mainstream literature. Moreover, they often emphasized the ways in which so-

employment, industrial accident, retirement, disability, ill health, death of a family breadwinner, or extreme poverty; some analysts also include provision of education and housing (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981). Despite these difficulties, I use the term to maintain continuity with social-scientific and historical studies of the causes and effects of modern social provision. I define the welfare state, or state social provision, as interventions by the state in civil society to alter social and market forces. However, I do not judge a priori that all state social interventions are aimed at, or actually produce, greater equality among citizens; I discuss this issue further below.

I prefer to use the term “male-dominant,” rather than “patriarchal,” to describe the gender order in Western states in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Historically, “patriarchy” refers to “a form of male dominance in which fathers control families and families are the units of social and economic power,” not to “a universal, unchanging deterministic social structure which denies agency to women” (Gordon 1988b, p. vi; see also Cockburn 1990).

Using terms like “mainstream” and “feminist” to describe bodies of research that contain strikingly divergent conceptual frameworks is an oversimplification. My terminology conveys an important difference in the two literatures: Mainstream work has usually ignored gender differences and inequalities in social politics and policies, while feminist work has been premised on the importance of gender in social and political life.

Quadagno (1989) has confronted the assumptions of power resources analysis. Some other works also span feminist and mainstream research: Gordon (1988a) discussed Piven and Cloward’s (1971) influential work from a feminist perspective; Hobson (1990) examined women’s economic dependence in OECD countries and how this is related to efforts to decrease class inequality (the focus of much of the mainstream comparative research); and Skocpol (1992) offered a gendered analysis of American social provision of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in contrast to mainstream interpretations.

Feminist theory on the welfare state has come from two camps, neither of which has been particularly engaged in scholarly debate with researchers carrying out empirical investigations of the welfare state. First, a socialist-feminist group has debated Marxists about the character of the system that the welfare state allegedly reinforces — a debate that is essentially an extension at an abstract level of the debates about capitalism and patriarchy (McIntosh 1978; for criticism of this approach and an exemplary comparative analysis, see Jenson 1986). Second, women working in the area of democratic and liberal theory have critiqued the “masters” for their nongendered analyses of citizenship and political participation (for a review, see Jones 1990).
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Social policies reflect and reinforce relations of dominance and exploitation, thus arguing for understanding the welfare state as functional for patriarchy and capitalism (Wilson 1977; McIntosh 1978; Abromovitz 1988). They were concerned with the qualitative effects of modern social provision, but assumed invariance in the regulatory function of welfare states.

Meanwhile, most comparative studies of the welfare state have focused on expenditure data unsuited to examining power relations, making it easier for feminist researchers to dismiss this work as irrelevant to their concerns. Indeed, mainstream scholars simply assume that the welfare state is a mechanism for making society more egalitarian; they routinely refer to systems of social provision in Western capitalist democracies as “welfare states,” taking at face value the claims of state elites about the character of social programs. The extent to which states actually promote citizens’ well-being or equality beyond income security is rarely investigated (Esping-Andersen 1990, chap. 1; Cates 1983, chap. 1). Mainstream scholars may have argued about the extent of equality promoted by social programs, but saw variation in linear terms—a state’s “welfare effort,” measured by social expenditures as a proportion of GNP, resulted in more or less equality, usually conceptualized in class or income terms. Until recently, then, the predominant theoretical and methodological approaches within the two literatures tended to neglect qualitative variation in the effects of state social provision over time and across nations.

Recent methodological and theoretical changes within the two groups may increase the chances of a fruitful conversation. Feminist research on the welfare state is taking a comparative turn, focusing on the variation in the gender content of systems of social provision (Ruggie 1984; Jenson 1986, 1991; Michel and Koven 1990; Lewis 1992; Skocpol and Ritter 1991). Meanwhile, several mainstream comparative welfare state researchers, especially those associated with the “power resources” school of analysis, are focusing on variation in

the rights of citizenship (Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1989, 1990; Palme 1990; Myles 1989; Kolberg 1992). This work provides a bridge to recent feminist work on the welfare state that examines the gendered character of social rights or claims on the state and the possibility that these rights can enhance the relative position of women (Piven 1985; Hernes 1987, 1988; Siim 1988; Gordon 1990; Orloff 1991; Skocpol 1992; Shaver 1990; Sarvasy 1992; O’Connor forthcoming). These social citizenship perspectives emphasize the potential of social provision in democratic states, secured at least partially through the political struggles of citizens and others, to counter domination even as they acknowledge that this potential is often far from being realized. The programs of the modern welfare state differentially advantage various social groups, and there is important variation across countries and programs, as well as over time, in the extent to which the interests of dominant and subordinate groups are enhanced. In short, social citizenship analysts envision social policy as having an emancipatory as well as a regulatory potential. Even where emancipation is not a manifest objective, social programs may have unintended “independence effects.”

To understand the mutual effects of state social provision and gender relations requires a conceptual scheme that can be used in systematic comparative research. Rather than developing such a scheme anew, I would argue that it will be more fruitful to directly engage the conceptual frameworks of mainstream literature and propose amendments that will reflect what is already known about gender relations and the state. Feminist research can thereby incorporate advances in the mainstream literature while transforming it to incorporate gender relations.

I offer some critical reflections on the analytic categories of mainstream comparative and historical research on the welfare state, especially those employed by the influential “power resources” school of analysis. The power resources school has demonstrated in some careful studies that “politics matter,” in contrast to those that contend that social policy simply reflects the systemic “needs” of capitalist, industrialized societies. Rather than enter into this debate, I concentrate on the power resources group because they have developed a frame-
work for evaluating the content of social provision, the “dependent variable” if you will.\(^7\)

The concern of the power resources analysts with qualitative rather than quantitative characteristics of the welfare state is useful for investigating power relations, of paramount importance in understanding the relationship between state social provision and gender relations. Over the last decade, scholars at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, under the direction of Korpi and Esping-Andersen, have assembled an impressive data set on the quality of social rights and how these rights affect different citizens in eighteen OECD countries for the period 1930 through 1985 (Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990). This research group has formulated a systematic scheme for comparative analysis of state systems of social provision that focuses on three key dimensions: (1) state-market relations, (2) stratification, and (3) social citizenship rights, including, in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) scheme, how this affects the “decommodification” of labor.

The power resources analysts’ framework provides a good starting point for analyzing the gender content of state social provision. But serious conceptual work must be done before applying it to the interrelation between state social provision and gender relations. I do not mean that research should simply look at what the welfare state does for or to women, although that is clearly part of the task. Rather, gender must be incorporated into the core concepts of research on the welfare state — “citizen,” “social rights,” “claims,” “welfare” — and the analytic dimensions used to evaluate inputs, content, and effects. “Gendering” the analytic framework means two things. First, because power resources analysis does not consider gender relations, its conceptual apparatus must be reworked to incorporate gender. Second, the key issue for a feminist analysis of the welfare state — the effects of state social provision on gender relations — requires new conceptual categories and analytic dimensions.

Power resources researchers begin from the premise that workers are oppressed by capitalism, which transforms labor power into a commodity. However, political rights in democratic polities enable workers to mobilize to further their interests. These scholars build on Marshall’s (1950) distinction between types of citizenship rights — civil, political, and social (Korpi 1989, p. 312; see also Hasenfeld, Rafferty, and Zald 1987).\(^8\) The development of social rights reversed the nineteenth-century separation of social protection from citizenship. Along with Marshall, they maintain that this critical social transformation took institutional form in a move away from poor relief to modern social policies, like social insurance and universal benefits based on citizenship. They link social rights based on citizenship to an account of political mobilization that draws on Marxist and Weberian analysis and the social-democratic traditions of parliamentary socialism. They identify two major power resources in Western societies: capital, an inherently unequally distributed market-based resource, and the right to vote and organize for collective political action, a right that is presumed to be equally distributed in democracies (Korpi 1985). The class-related distribution of

\(^7\) Thus, to the question, “Why not pick on my own perspective, state-centered or institutionalist analysis?” I would say that few commentators have dealt with its conceptualization of the content of welfare states. Rather, their attention has focused on the role of characteristics of the state in policy developments.

\(^8\) Marshall (1950) defined citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community,” and he saw citizens as “equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.” However, the content of citizenship rights varies because “no universal principle . . . determines what those rights and duties shall be” (pp. 28–29). Analyzing the experience of British working men over the last three centuries, Marshall presented an evolutionary argument about the development of civil, political, and social citizenship rights (Barbalet 1988). He argued that in the eighteenth century, civil rights gradually attached to the status of freedom already enjoyed by male members of the community. Political rights — primarily the franchise — were first granted to property owners, but were extended to all citizens, including women, over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Marshall 1950, p. 20). Social rights — “the whole range from a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society” — which is associated with the welfare state, are the product of twentieth-century political changes (Marshall 1950, p. 11).
power resources explains variation in the outcomes of political struggles for social rights (Korpi 1989). Capitalists have greater resources in the market, while workers (because of their numbers) have greater resources in the polity. Wage earners, they argue, will use their political resources to modify market processes and extend social rights. Conversely, capitalists will fight to let market-based processes determine welfare outcomes and to limit social rights. This is the theoretical context for the claim that workers’ political struggles can secure social rights that “push back the frontiers of capitalist power” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 16). This is accomplished by empowering workers vis-à-vis the market — providing social benefits that “weaken the whip of the market” and promote working-class political solidarity (Palme 1990, p. 8). Thus, the analytic scheme for describing the content of the welfare state is related to their theory of working-class interests and the dynamics of social policy development — the scheme was developed to answer the question of how states affect class relations. What of gender in the power resources framework? To put it bluntly, it is simply absent. Its concepts are explicitly gender-neutral — but the categories of workers, state-market relations, stratification, citizenship, and decommodification are based on a male standard; moreover, gender relations and their effects are ignored.

Feminists are interested in gendering the questions and categories of the power resources analysts. However, feminists are also asking a different question: Can the welfare state alter gender relations? This question suggests a different research agenda and new conceptual categories. Feminist analysts are less unified about the factors that underlie women’s oppression than are mainstream welfare state analysts on the factors underlying class oppression.9 This lack of agreement makes it more difficult to specify just what the state would have to do to push back the frontiers of male dominance.10 But despite important theoretical differences, I think it is possible to focus on the processes and institutions that most feminist analysts agree are important to gender relations and that are affected by state policies. Fundamental to full social participation and self-determination are control over one’s body and bodily capacities (including sexuality and reproduction) and the right to political participation. These are not central to the welfare state, but are part of the relevant context for evaluating the effects of the state on gender relations. Many institutions and processes constitute gender relations and are directly affected by state social provision: the sexual division of labor (including the treatment of care work and coreworkers), access to paid work (as a central role in our societies and as a means of survival), and marriage and family relations.11 In the following pages, I discuss and critique the power resources analysts’ understanding of citizenship and their analytic scheme for describing social policy regimes, then propose an alternative scheme for evaluating and categorizing state social provision that can capture both class and gender effects.12

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9 The problem of specifying gender interests or women’s interests has troubled the feminist-influenced literature in political sociology (much as specifying class interests has troubled mainstream political sociologists) (Jonasdottir 1988; Molyneux 1985).

10 One body of feminist theory highlights the importance of men’s control of women’s bodies and sexuality and the concomitant compulsion for women to enter heterosexual relationships to service men’s personal and sexual needs. Another school of thought focuses on gender differences and the control of biological reproduction. Many feminist political theorists have been concerned with legal, political, and organizational barriers to gender equality, including women’s subjugation to male family heads and exclusion from politics — both participatory decision-making arenas and control of the means of administration and coercion. Still other theorists focus on men’s control of women’s labor through the sexual division of labor, exploiting women’s economic dependence, and sex segregation in occupations; these theorists are especially concerned with the relationship between gender and class power. Of course, many analysts recognize that more than one dynamic is involved in producing gender relations. (For overviews, see Walby 1990; Connell 1987; Tong 1989; Collins 1991.)

11 I focus on elements of social provision that have a significant impact on gender relations, but these elements do not necessarily affect all women or all men in the same ways (Spelman 1988; Crenshaw 1989; Harris 1990). These dimensions will need rethinking and supplementation also from the perspective of incorporating racial and ethnic relations, which I do not here attempt.

12 I focus on the conceptualization of these dimensions, rather than on their operationalization in empirical studies. The operationalization presents...
Who Is a Citizen?

The political struggles of citizens are critical to the power resources analysts’ understanding of policy developments. But just as the independent male householder serves as the ideal-typical citizen in classical liberal and democratic theory, the male worker serves as the ideal-typical citizen in the literature on social rights (in Korpi 1989 or Esping-Andersen 1990 as much as in Marshall 1950). As Hernes notes, “The social-democratic citizen is the citizen worker, a male family provider, a working-class hero. His rights, identities and participation patterns were determined by his ties to the labour market, and by the web of associations and corporate structures which had grown up around these ties” (1988, p. 190, emphases in original). Indeed, “in the ‘democratic’ welfare state . . . employment rather than military service is the key to citizenship” because it bestows the independence that is the “central criterion for citizenship” and is associated with men (Pateman 1988a, pp. 238–39).

Power resources analysis begins with economically independent citizens (i.e., wage earners) and considers the cross-national, historical, and class variations in the ways social rights affect them. Analysts focus on those aspects of state social provision that are most relevant for male wage earners and breadwinners, that is, programs that compensate workers for losses incurred in the paid labor market, such as old-age pensions and unemployment insurance. They then examine the basis on which people make claims for state help—need, financial contribution or citizenship—and the associated variation in outcomes. The use of a male standard is not explicit, and power resources analysis—like most mainstream comparative research on the welfare state—uses gender-neutral language and categories. Myles (1989, pp. 135–36) acknowledged this problem in his own past work and called for gendering these categories in future analyses (also see Pateman 1988a, p. 232).

An illustration of the implicit male standard appeared in recent comparative analyses by the Korpi–Esping-Andersen project that focused on the ways in which social rights affect “typical cases” because “legislative statements are difficult to compare” (Palme 1990, p. 27). The “typical cases” used in the project’s analyses included “an ‘average’ production worker in manufacturing industry” and the same worker with dependent spouse and two children (Palme 1990; Korpi 1989, p. 315; Esping-Andersen 1990). Of course, because of prevailing sex segregation in occupations and household composition, both these “average” workers happened to be men. The analysts then assessed the quality of benefits that replace lost income for these average citizens based on their degree of labor market participation, using average wages as a baseline. The social rights of citizens who are economically dependent, the vast majority of whom are women, were not considered. Analysts should not rest with an adumbration of social rights for “typical” worker-citizens—such ungendered citizens do not exist. Men make claims as worker-citizens to compensate for failures in the labor market; women make claims as workers, but also as members of families, and they need programs especially to compensate for marriage failures and/or the need to raise children alone.

Gender and Citizenship Rights

The power resources school assumes that civil and political rights are equally available to all citizens to use in mobilizing to secure greater social rights. Thus, it ignores gender differences in access to civil and political rights, including the legal rights of personhood. Korpi (1983) noted variation in the extent of formal equality of citizenship rights but not with reference to gender; Esping-Andersen made no


14 The average wage was calculated from data for adult men and women in manufacturing; it assumed full-time, all-year work. Thus, the typical male standard of living was the benchmark for pension adequacy, but deviations from that standard are not understood as having gender implications. Analysts see inequalities in benefits solely in class terms.

Feminist analyses of citizenship highlighted sexuality, reproduction, and physical bodies: “Citizenship is defined as a practice of embodied subjects whose sex/gendered identity affects fundamentally their membership and participation in public life” (Jones 1990, p. 786). Women face gender-specific threats to their bodily integrity both inside and outside the family. As Shaver (1990) argued, “rights in the control of one’s body and sexual person, as in marriage, consent to sexual activity, and the control of fertility and reproduction” have a taken-for-granted character for men, but are contested issues for women. Feminist theory points to the subjugation of women in the private sphere of the family, which according to liberal theory ought to be (and in practice usually has been) free from state interference (Pateman 1988a, 1988b, 1989; Eisenstein 1981). For example, because of the inviolate nature of “family privacy” in Western countries, husbands have been allowed to rape and batter their wives. Only recently have there been some tentative legal reforms limiting these “rights” and endowing women with the right to be free from such attacks (Breines and Gordon 1983; Yllo and Bograd 1988; Pateman 1988a, pp. 238–39; MacKinnon 1989, chap. 9; Smart 1989, p. 32; Russell 1982; Hamner, Radford, and Stanko 1989). The “female fear” of rape also curtails women’s access to public spaces, sexual harassment is an important component of men’s power in the workplace, and the state also threatens reproductive freedoms (Connell 1987; MacKinnon 1989; Cockburn 1991; Petchesky 1984). In sum, relations of domination based on control of women’s bodies in the family, the workplace, and public spaces undermine women’s abilities to participate as “independent individuals” — citizens — in the polity, which in turn affect their capacities to demand and utilize social rights. The ways that states intervene — or refuse to — are critical to women’s situation.

Political rights are also a problem for women. Women’s gender was once considered reason enough for exclusion from the suffrage. After the vote was won, the extent to which actual equality of rights was achieved has varied. However, this variation has not entered the analytic frameworks of mainstream researchers. In all forms of formal political activity save voting, women participate at a lesser rate than men (Randall 1987; Nelson 1984); for power resources analysts such participation is, of course, the basis for enriching social citizenship in the first place.

A complete analysis of states’ effects on gender relations should not rest with “social rights” as they are defined by mainstream researchers. Rather, analyses of social rights should include an examination of family law and the legal frameworks and social programs dealing with legal personhood and the control of one’s bodily capacities and functions. Furthermore, the analysis must examine issues of political rights and participation (Hernes 1988). An accurate picture of the content and effects of state social provision should not begin from the premise of a gender-neutral citizenship. Rather, one must take account of the very real gender differences in productive and reproductive labor and access to civil and political rights and how these differences influence the ways in which men and women struggle for and claim benefits from the state as citizens.

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE

Esping-Andersen (1990) and Korpi (1989) propose three dimensions that characterize the content of the welfare state: the relationship

15 Indeed, gendered analyses point out the illiberal aspects of capitalist and democratic societies which are usually also considered liberal. (Some analyses investigating race and ethnicity, such as critical race theory, make similar observations [see, e.g., Crenshaw 1989; Williams 1991; Matsuda 1989]). “Feminists have pointed to the contradiction between the rules of the public sphere built on consent and voluntary associations, and the rules of the private sphere built on oppression and natural subjugation, and they have argued that this division prevents women from realizing a full democratic citizenship” (Siim 1988, p. 163).

16 Skocpol (1992) described women’s unusual political capacities in the Progressive Era in the United States. Despite being denied the franchise, women waged successful campaigns in most states for mothers’ pensions and other legislation. This episode underlines the difficulties of applying Marshall’s evolutionary analysis of citizen rights to women.

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between the state and the market in providing welfare, the effects of the welfare state on social stratification, and the character of social rights (which in Esping-Andersen’s scheme [1990] includes how these affect the de-commodification of labor). Clustering of systems along these three dimensions defines regime types. Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987) built on the work of analysts, such as Titmuss (1958), who distinguished between “residual” and “institutional” welfare states (see also Baldwin 1990). “Residual” welfare states only react to market or family “failures” and limit assistance to marginal or especially “deserving” social groups; “institutional” welfare states are pro-active and are committed to the welfare needs of all strata of the population. Esping-Andersen (1990) constructed a typology of regimes representing “three worlds of welfare capitalism”—liberal, conservative-corporatist and social-democratic—by characterizing systems of social provision along the three dimensions. Liberal regimes roughly correspond to the “residual” states, while social-democratic and conservative-corporatist regimes may be distinguished within the group of “institutional” states. Social-democratic regimes are universalistic and egalitarian, while the conservative-corporatist regimes preserve status and class differentials. Despite the fact that “there is no single pure case,” Esping-Andersen classified the United States, Canada, Australia, and (probably) Great Britain as liberal regimes; the Nordic countries are identified as social-democratic regimes; and Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are conservative-corporatist regimes.

The State-Market Relations Dimension
A fundamental dimension that varies across welfare states concerns the “range, or domain, of human needs that are satisfied by social policy” instead of by the market (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, p. 41), that is, “how state activities are interlocked with the market’s and the family’s role in social provision” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 21). Korpi (1989) contended that as public provisions are put in place, this “decreases the scope of markets and changes the basis of distribution in these areas from market power to political resources. In the areas involved in the equal status of citizenship, the criteria for distribution thus shifts from buying power on the market toward politically based considerations of justice” (p. 313). Thus, there will be class-influenced debates over the content of social policy and over the relative roles of markets and politics in determining welfare outcomes.

States in a given regime-type act similarly in regard to the market. In countries with a liberal social policy regime, the market, rather than the state, guarantees most welfare needs of most citizens. For instance, in Canada, Britain, and the United States public pension benefits make up a smaller proportion of the incomes of the elderly than they do in Scandinavian countries or in Europe (Myles 1989, pp. 123–24). Moreover, liberal states tend to respond to societal “failures” rather than intervene to prevent problems from occurring. Thus, programs in liberal regimes avoid undercutting the market by offering only stigmatizing subsistence-level grants to those unable to participate in the market. In contrast, social-democratic and conservative regimes are pro-active and retain a larger range of welfare activities, effectively crowding out the market. For example, in both these types of regimes, private pension schemes for better-off workers have been forestalled by the expansion and elaboration of state programs to cover all strata of the population (Palme 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990, chap. 4).

The Stratification Dimension
A second dimension of policy regimes is stratification: “The welfare state ... is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social relations” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 23; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, p. 40). Thus, against the common view that “welfare states” promote greater equality, power resources analysts argue that systems of social provision have stratifying effects: Some policies may promote equality, cross-class solidarity, or minimize economic differences, while others may promote social dualism or maintain or strengthen class, status, or occupational differentiation (Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990). Social-democratic regimes foster solidarity by including all citizens in common programs, and they reduce class differences through income redistribution. Conservative-corporatist regimes reinforce status and occupational differentiation by offering separate provision for different social
strata, such as distinct programs for blue-collar and white-collar workers. Liberal regimes encourage social dualisms between the desperate minority, that relies on limited forms of social assistance, and the majority, that relies principally on the market for welfare (e.g., private pensions and health plans). These regimes do not greatly modify market-generated stratification or social mobility — any reductions of social inequalities occur over the life-span rather than across classes.

The three types of regimes (social-democratic, conservative-corporatist, and liberal) also institutionalize distinctive patterns of policy interests that help to shape the political alliances and enmities that affect subsequent political struggles over policy (Esping-Andersen 1985; Baldwin 1990). Power resources analysts have focused almost exclusively on the ways in which policies affect class coalitions. Others highlighted the ways in which specific features of social provisions “feed back” into politics by encouraging certain alliances while discouraging others, defining the terms of debate and developing certain state capacities (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988; Stryker 1990; Heclo 1974; Jenson 1986, 1991).

The Social Citizenship Rights/Decommodification Dimension

The third dimension of the welfare state concerns the character of the social rights of citizenship. Some benefits are universal, that is, they are available to all citizens or to all citizens of a certain age or condition (e.g., sickness, unemployment, parenthood); some benefits depend on labor market participation and financial contribution; and some benefits are income-tested, that is, they are available only to those with incomes and assets below a certain level. These distinctions regulate access to benefits, and along with benefit levels and the range of entitlements, they determine the “degree to which the individual’s typical life situation is freed from dependence on the labor market” (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, p. 40).

Esping-Andersen (1990) linked social rights to what he termed the decommodification of labor:

It is as markets become universal and hegemonic that the welfare of individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people were commodified. In turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of pure commodity status. Decommodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market. (pp. 21–22)

For Esping-Andersen (1990), decommodification is the heart of the welfare state’s emancipatory potential:

As commodities, people are captive to powers beyond their control. . . . If workers actually do behave as discrete commodities, they will by definition compete; and the fiercer the competition, the cheaper the price. As commodities, workers are replaceable, easily redundant, and atomized. Decommodification is . . . , as Polanyi argued, necessary for system survival. It is also a precondition for a tolerable level of individual welfare and security. Finally, without de-commodification, workers are incapable of collective action; it is, accordingly, the alpha and omega of the unity and solidarity required for labor-movement development. (p. 37)

Esping-Andersen argued that the extent to which the rights embodied in social programs promote or circumscribe decommodification of labor is a critical dimension that varies across welfare states. The most decommodifying systems offer many generous benefits simply on the basis of citizenship, whereas the least decommodifying have a relatively circumscribed range of social rights and most assistance is means-tested, which severely limits the emancipatory potential of benefits. Social-democratic regimes are the most decommodifying since provision is generous, many benefits are universal, and access is relatively easy for workers. Liberal regimes limit decommodification of labor by conditioning limited benefits on means tests or contributions based on work. Conservative-corporatist regimes, which have strong citizenship rights to social benefits, do not promote decommodification of labor, because the conditions for benefits reinforce reliance on work and the market — typically benefits are linked to contributions.

GENDERING THE DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE STATES

The three dimensions proposed by Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987; see also Korpi 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990) have given ana-
lytic coherence to diverse comparative studies and have revealed distinctive clusters of countries based on their systems of social provision. Yet, the dimensions are clearly flawed because of their inattention to gender.

**Gendering the State-Market-Family Relations Dimension**

Power resources analysts generally have given more attention to the “division of labor” between states and markets in providing welfare than to relations among states, markets, and families. Indeed, the distinction between public and private is seen as a distinction between politics and the market — families are ignored as “private” providers of welfare goods and services (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, p. 41). Provision of welfare “counts” only when it occurs through the state or the market, while women’s unpaid work in the home is ignored. Furthermore, the sexual division of labor within states, markets, and families also goes unnoticed. This dimension should be reconstructed based on the recognition of the importance of families and women’s unpaid work to the provision of social welfare, in addition to considering gendered patterns of work. State provision that helps to shift the burden of welfare from the family to the state, or from women to men within the family furthers women’s gender interests.

Recently, Esping-Andersen (1990) has noted some important differences across regimes in relations between states and families, that is, “how state activities are interlocked with the market’s and the family’s role in social provision” (p. 21). He focused on services that respond to “family needs . . . [and] also allow women to choose work rather than the household” (p. 28). Conservative-corporatist regimes respect the principle of subsidiarity — the “state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 27), but will not provide services that enable mothers (or other primary caretakers) to enter the paid labor force. Thus, these regimes reinforce traditional family relations. In liberal regimes, “concerns of gender matter less than the sanctity of the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 28), whereas social-democratic regimes attempt to “preemptively socialize the costs of familyhood,” for example, by assuming partial responsibility for care of the aged (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 28). Social-democratic regimes also encourage mothers to work in the paid work force by providing day care and parental leaves.

Although Esping-Andersen is right to recognize the effects of services on women’s abilities to enter the paid labor force, his classification scheme does not reflect differences in how care is provided. While liberal regimes, like the United States and Britain, lag in government provision of welfare services, like child care or elder care, and allow the market to provide them, the social-democratic Swedish state offers extensive services (Ruggie 1984; Bergmann 1986). Yet among social-democratic states, services are not the same: Women in Sweden are likely to work outside the home, whereas Norway’s day-care provision is much less developed than Sweden’s and relatively more Norwegian mothers stay at home (Leira 1992). Within the conservative-corporatist group, France provides many services for working mothers while Germany promotes housewifery by offering few services. In the Netherlands, despite a strong social-democratic presence that has helped to establish extensive social rights for wage earners (Esping-Andersen 1990, pp. 52–53), families have access to few services, and women have high rates of housewifery and economic dependence (Knijn 1991; Jenson 1991; Hobson 1990, 1991a; Kamerman and Kahn 1981; Lewis 1992).

Esping-Andersen’s regime types do not fully predict women’s employment patterns. Esping-Andersen (1990, chaps. 6, 8) analyzed these patterns in Sweden, Germany, and the United States (as “representatives” of the three regime types). Provision of services is important to the Swedish welfare state, and this “provides a phenomenal multiplier-effect for female employment: Social services both allow women to work, and create a large labor-market within which they can find employment” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 159). The lack of services in Germany has retarded the growth of female employment, whereas women’s employment in the United States has increased sharply, driven by market forces, in spite of the dearth of public services. Yet other aspects of women’s work (e.g., sex segregation of occupations and part-time versus full-time work) are not accurately predicted by the regime types (O’Connor 1992). In Germany (a conservative-corporatist state) and Sweden (a social-democratic state),
women are heavily concentrated in part-time employment. Of the three countries, Sweden has the highest level of sex segregation in occupations, and although Germany has a somewhat lower level of segregation, many fewer women work outside the home in the first place. In Sweden, occupational upgrading among women was accompanied by continued segregation, while sex desegregation of occupations is strongest in the United States and weakest in Germany (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 210). Thus, while the conservative-corporatist regime of Germany would be expected to preserve traditional economic dependence for women, the decline in the sex segregation of occupations in the liberal regime of the United States is unexpected. Nor would progressive Sweden be expected to have high levels of sex segregation of occupations, part-time employment and women doing the bulk of unpaid domestic work. (Working wives in Sweden do about 72 percent of housework compared to 74 percent in the United States [Wright, Shire, Hwang, Dolan, and Baxter 1992, p. 262; Ruggie 1988; Lewis 1992; Baxter 1993]).

These analytic inadequacies are related to some of Esping-Andersen’s premises, which neglect gender relations and feminist scholarship. He sees women as choosIng between “work and the household,” with work possible for most women only if state services are widely available. Yet women in Scandinavia and elsewhere do not choose between paid work and unpaid housewifery (including mothering) as exclusive activities (Hobson 1991a) — they can choose to be stay-at-home wives and mothers only or combine paid work with their domestic work. Nowhere in the industrialized West can married women and mothers choose not to engage in caring and domestic labor (unless they are wealthy enough to purchase the services of others). Land and Rose (1985, p. 93) call this situation “compulsory altruism” for women (Taylor-Gooby 1991, p. 102). The core aspects of the sexual division of labor remain: Women perform most domestic work whether or not they work for pay, while men do very little domestic work.

Understanding gender relations, particularly the sexual division of labor, helps explain women’s employment patterns. Many women work part-time because this arrangement “allows” them to do their domestic work (Beechey and Perkins 1987). Thus, the dimension of state-market relations as formulated by Esping-Andersen simply ignores the tremendous amount of caring labor and housework provided by women — housewives and wage earners alike. Feminist research on the “labor of caring” shows that in all industrialized Western countries, welfare — tending to children, the elderly, the sick and disabled — is largely provided in private households by women without pay, rather than by states, markets and voluntary nonprofit organizations; all Western welfare states depend upon this care to a great extent (Finch and Groves 1983; Land 1983; Land and Rose 1985; Waerness 1984; Taylor-Gooby 1991, p.101).

The sexual division of labor in caretaking and domestic work within institutions other than the family must also be considered. Indeed, women carry out a disproportionate share of welfare work, whether it is provided by the state, private organizations, corporations, or the family. To the extent that this work is undervalued in terms of benefits and political respect, women suffer disproportionately.

Power resources analysts recognize that the “division of labor” between states and markets in providing welfare is a political question, that is, it is a question of which decision rules apply and which actors control the distribution of valued resources. Clearly, the division of labor between markets and polities is based on relations of power. There is no similar recognition of the division of labor between families and states in providing domestic and caretaking labor, welfare services, and goods. Power resources analysts simply do not discuss power relations within the family. For example, they ignore the fact that the distributions of income, resources, and work within the family are conditioned on power as well as benevolence and shared interests (Hobson 1990; Pahl 1983, 1988; Land 1983; England and Kilbourne 1990; Acker 1988). To the extent that any aspect of men’s power within the family is acknowledged, it is that based on women’s economic dependence (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 28). However, it is not named as men’s power, nor is it related to other sources of gen-

17 I should note that I am hardly the first to point out that liberal or leftist men, even those with good intentions, seem to wear conceptual blinders when the issue is men’s and women’s unequal power in the family (e.g., see the essays in Sargent 1981).
der power, such as sex segregation of occupations, the division of household work, or men's control of women's bodies.

Men as a gender have power — a power resource, to use the terminology of Korpi and Esping-Andersen — flowing from their control of women's domestic and caring labor and of their bodies. Of course, women are not powerless in families, any more than workers are powerless on the job because capitalists have greater market resources. But the power imbalance between the genders in families is important politically. Because of the power relations in families, shifting decision-making about the distribution of resources or the provision of services from families to polities is parallel to shifting decision-making from markets to states, for it is a shift from an arena in which resources are disproportionately controlled by men to one in which power may be more equally distributed between men and women. Although the (electoral) numbers are not as decisively favorable to women as they are to wage earners, polities' decision rules and guiding ideologies are more likely to equalize outcomes than to leave these decisions to individuals within families. The failure to recognize gender relations and power within the family and outside the family blinds the power resources analysts to aspects of social policy regimes that affect gender relations.

The conceptualization of a "division of labor" among states and markets must also include families as significant providers of welfare, and the unpaid caring and domestic work of women must be explicitly recognized. The state is woman-friendly to the extent that policies reduce the sexual division of labor by shifting the burden of domestic work to public services and to men. Of course, whether it is men or public servants (especially if the public servants are women) who take on the private and unpaid caring and domestic burdens of housewives and caretakers also affects gender relations and the shape of distinctive gender regimes.

Gendering the Stratification Dimension

Power resources analysts have focused on the effects of state social provision on class hierarchies, but have ignored its effects on gender hierarchies. Their existing scheme could capture gender differences in benefit levels that depend on labor market processes. Women's inferior status in the work force means that women are disproportionately disadvantaged when benefits reflect work-related inequality.

To date, however, researchers have not done even this minimal gender-sensitive analysis (but see Quadagno 1988; Pearce 1978, 1983, 1986). They have not addressed two significant ways that states reinforce the gender hierarchy: (1) privileging full-time paid workers over workers who do unpaid work or who combine part-time paid work with domestic and caring labor, and (2) reinforcing the sexual division of labor in which women do the bulk of unpaid work.

In most systems of social provision, men's claims are based on paid work, while far fewer women make such claims. Contributions from wages to social insurance funds bring entitlement to benefits, and even in the case of needs-
based or universal entitlements, men’s claims are usually made because of loss of paid employment. In contrast, most women’s claims in most Western welfare states are based on familial or marital roles (i.e., on the basis of unpaid domestic and caring work) although the proportion has been declining in the last few decades (Fraser 1989; Gordon 1990; Nelson 1984, 1990). (Of course, all such claims do not receive equal treatment, as factors like race, ethnicity, or marital status also have effects.) In all systems of social provision, claims based on motherhood or marriage to a covered wage earner, which often have more stringent eligibility requirements, are associated with lower benefit levels than are direct, work-based claims.

A number of American scholars have mapped the differences in treatment between caring/unpaid labor and paid labor onto the dualistic structure of the U.S. welfare state. They have identified a “two-tier” system in which social assistance programs serve a predominantly female clientele, while contributory social insurance targets a predominantly male clientele (Pearce 1978, 1983, 1986; Nelson 1984, 1990; Acker 1988; Fraser 1989). Stark inequalities exist between the two types of programs. Social assistance programs, on which many single mothers rely for income protection (e.g., “welfare” or Aid to Families with Dependent Children) are politically less legitimate, less generously funded, and more oriented to monitoring clients’ behavior and income than are social insurance programs (e.g., “social security,” or Old Age, Survivors’ and Disability Insurance) on which most unemployed and retired wage-earning men rely.22

Although this “two-tier” formulation captures some of the ways that careworkers are undervalued, it is misleading in some respects. It focuses only on the direct claims made by men and women — male workers’ contributions entitle them to social insurance benefits, while needy mothers claim benefits based on an income test and their family/marital status. In fact, although women are overrepresented among the clients of social assistance schemes, they are a majority of clients in most social welfare programs, including the old-age programs of Social Security (unemployment insurance is one prominent exception). Indeed, many more women are indirectly incorporated in the welfare state on the basis of their husbands’ contributions than claim benefits as needy carers. Unlike women who receive social assistance, wives or widows with or without children who receive social security are treated as “rights-bearers” rather than as clients — their marital tie to a covered breadwinner entitles them to the same standardized treatment and nationally-determined, inflation-indexed benefits accorded to men who receive social security. These women are thus better off than women who depend on welfare, but they are also worse off relative to men within the same program because dependents’ benefits are only 50 percent of the main beneficiary’s entitlement (although a survivor gets the full amount after the death of the main beneficiary) (Burkhauser and Holden 1983).23

In the United States, the difference between the two tiers of social insurance and social assistance — often understood as the difference in treatment between men and women — is better conceptualized as a difference between members of families that are, or were, headed by a male breadwinner with an economically dependent wife (and children), and families maintained by women who are not in the paid labor force, or work on its fringes, who must make claims based on their status as mothers.

Families with Dependent Children. Also, childless women are also ineligible for AFDC.

21 I am not sure where the “two-tier” formulation originated, but countless authors now repeat that it indeed exists. Nelson (1984, pp. 221–23) provided an early and often-cited discussion of this concept, in which she recognizes the gender differences in the clienteles of social assistance versus social insurance programs in the United States, as well as the distinction between the types of claims made within these different tiers. While Nelson is careful not to conflate the two, many of those who cite her work have been less careful.

22 American men who do not qualify for social insurance programs — disproportionately ethnic and racial minorities — must rely on social assistance programs (usually called general assistance), which are not available nationwide, receive no federal funding, and are less generous than Aid to

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23 Access to indirect claims differs for women in different classes and racial and ethnic groups: A woman must be married to a man in covered employment to receive dependents’ benefits. However, men who are blue-collar workers or members of racial or ethnic minorities are more likely to be unemployed, which then affects the women who depend on them for financial support.
This complicates the argument that two-tiered systems generate distinctive interests for all women — some women are tied to the welfare state as mothers, while others are tied to the state as wives (although divorce — or the threat of it — may weaken that bond for some women). This distinction can be significant politically because it reinforces differences between two-parent families and single-parent families, as has occurred in the United States (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988). Although the “two-tiered” formulation has sometimes been generalized to other nation’s systems of social provision, this is problematic. For example, most of Australia’s social programs are means-tested, while the Nordic countries rely on universal programs supplemented by contributory insurance (Shaver 1983; Hernes 1987).

Social insurance programs may not treat men’s and women’s work-based claims equally, either. Gaining eligibility for social insurance programs is often more difficult for working women than for working men. For example, until recently, married women had to be unable to perform housework and paid work to claim work-related disability benefits under Britain’s social insurance system (Pateman 1988a, pp. 247–50; Pascall 1986). Under U.S. unemployment insurance programs, claimants may be declared ineligible because they are unable to work at any time or place because of child care responsibilities or spouses’ work commitments (Pearce 1986).

In a few welfare states — primarily in the Nordic countries — men and women receive benefits solely on the basis of citizenship. This arrangement is most common in health insurance or medical care and flat-rate old-age pensions. Thus, many analysts consider benefits based on universal citizenship to be most likely to further gender equality. Although citizenship-based benefits may be more conducive to equality than work- or need-based benefits, the range of needs covered by such benefits often betrays a gender bias. For example, benefits claimed on the basis of paid work receive funding priority while the public services that women depend on are not funded sufficiently to serve all those eligible (Hobson 1990, p. 247; Ruggie 1984, chap. 6).

The Scandinavian states also tend to privilege those claiming benefits based on labor market participation. Since the 1960s, entitlements based solely on citizenship have declined because the universal flat-rate pensions have been superseded by earnings-related pensions (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, pp. 50–53; Kangas and Palme 1992). Although the poverty rate in Sweden is much lower than that in the United States, women and men outside the paid labor force in both countries fare worse than those who have or had a secure attachment to it (McLanahan, Casper, and Sørenson 1992). Indeed, Hernes (1988) argued that “there is the underlying assumption [in Sweden and throughout Europe], almost never expressed openly, that universal welfare state services and transfers must not exceed those earned in the labour market. . . . There is a political struggle between men and women to count also certain types of unpaid work as a legitimate basis for welfare rights” (p. 194).

States perpetuate the gender division of labor in a variety of ways; for instance, gaining entitlement to social assistance sometimes requires women to demonstrate homemaking skills (Abromovitz 1988; Pascall 1986; Fraser 1989). Both the U.S. and British social security systems offer greater benefits to “housewife-maintaining families” (usually by offering dependents’ or survivors’ benefits under the old age program) than to single individuals or dual-earner couples (in which the woman can receive her own work-related benefits or the dependent’s benefits, but not both) (Bergmann 1986, p. 258; McIntosh 1978; Pascall 1986; Acker 1988). Other public mechanisms — from tax systems to the absence of services to alleviate domestic responsibilities — also maintain traditional divisions of labor.

Given the differential treatment accorded unpaid caring and domestic labor compared to paid labor and the ways in which program requirements reinforce the sexual division of labor in households and the workplace, analyses of states’ effects on stratification should include gender relations. The concept of stratification — if amended to account for these factors — remains a useful one.

Gender effects are also apparent in the ways in which systems of social provision affect social politics (i.e., “political feedback”). Power resources analysts have noted the dualism of liberal regimes: Benefits and services are meager and available only to the poorest individuals, forcing others to turn to the market for benefits and services. In liberal regimes, women make up a disproportionate share of those with-
out access to market-based welfare benefits, and thus are more dependent on public benefits and services than are men (Shaver 1983; Piven 1985; U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 1988, pp. 34-35; Taylor-Gooby 1991; Nelson 1984). Thus, dualism promoted by the welfare state has a gender dimension as well as a class dimension. As a result, some analysts have argued that women are more likely than men to give political support to public social provision.

Social-democratic regimes are alleged to produce a universalist social politics. However, an analysis of four Nordic welfare states found differences between men’s and women’s links to and attitudes toward the state (Hernes 1987, 1988). Men are politicized by their participation in the labor market, that is, they are linked to the state by their participation in corporatist organizations — employers’ associations and labor unions — that bargain directly with the state over social benefits. Although women are often workers, they are usually under-represented in corporatist decision-making bodies. More important, women’s status as clients and employees of the welfare state politicizes and mobilizes them. In Scandinavia, these gendered patterns of state-citizen relationships have gendered the debate over public versus private provision of welfare such that women are stronger supporters of state welfare benefits and services.

Systems of social protection produce gender differences as well as class differences in interests and coalitions. Indeed, comparisons of the relative salience of gender, class, and other bases of identity and mobilization in different welfare states should be revealing (Michel and Koven 1990; Skocpol and Ritter 1991; Jenson 1991; Skocpol 1992).

Gendering the Social Citizenship Rights/
Decommodification Dimension

In Esping-Anderson’s version of the power resources scheme, social rights that decommodify labor are essential to realizing the potential of the welfare state for emancipating the working class from the capitalist market and individual employers.\(^{24}\) Decommodification provides workers with income from outside the market, thereby strengthening their leverage in the market. Decommodification, which is tied to the political power inherent in citizenship, influences the political fortunes of working-class movements, and hence, the possibilities for social and political transformation. By ignoring gender differences in the situations of men and women workers, particularly with reference to domestic and caring labor, and in access to the paid labor force, Esping-Anderson’s concept is inadequate for understanding the effects of state social provision on all workers. Decommodification, as a dimension of policy regimes, must be understood in the context of gender relations and also must be supplemented by a new analytic dimension: the extent to which states guarantee women access to paid employment and services that enable them to balance home and work responsibilities, and the mechanisms and institutions that implement these guarantees.

Power resources analysts implicitly begin with the situation of male workers and ignore the gender division of labor that makes the situations of men and women in the paid work force different. Benefits that decommodify labor give male workers greater capacity to resist capital and enter the market on their own terms, but unpaid services provided by wives, mothers, daughters also enhance male workers’ capacities. Thus, to focus only on decommodification is misleading about male workers’ situation. What of women workers? Again, power resources analysis starts from an implicitly male premise: Women have “chosen” between housewifery and paid work, so that once they enter the paid labor force, their domestic responsibilities disappear from the analysis, and they become indistinguishable from male workers. Social benefits that decommodify labor affect women and men in different ways because their patterns of participation in paid and unpaid labor differ. For instance, taking parental leave, an example of a benefit that decommodifies labor, may reduce a working woman’s earning capacity because continuous service with an employer often pays off in increased wages (Bergmann 1986, pp. 77-80;

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24 Some class analysts are dissatisfied with the notion that state social provision under capitalism could decommodify labor. Clearly, Esping-Anderson’s analysis follows the tradition of reformist social democracy in which significant alleviation of the problems flowing from capitalist relations is believed to be possible.
TWO NEW DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE STATES

Access to Paid Work

How does an analysis based on the situation of commodified male workers deal with women working in the home? For many women and others excluded from paid labor, commodification—that is, obtaining a position in the paid labor force—is in fact potentially emancipatory. Contemporary and historical research has found that many women want paid work because it provides independence and enhanced leverage within marriage and the patriarchal family (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; England and Kilbourne 1990; Benenson 1991). Equal access to paid employment and equal pay has been a consistent — and contested — demand of women’s movements over the past century (Hobson 1991b). In marriages (or other family relationships) in which power relations are based largely on economic dependence, access to paid work and to the services that make employment a viable option for mothers (or other caretakers) is as important as — perhaps even more important than — the insulation from market pressures provided by commodification.25 Thus, the commodification dimension must be supplemented with a new analytic dimension that taps into the extent to which states promote or discourage women’s paid employment — the right to be commodified, if you will. I call this fourth dimension of welfare-state regimes access to paid work. In some countries, men’s rights to jobs are promoted through full employment and active labor market policies. Thus, I contend that the extent to which the state ensures access to paid work for different groups and the mechanisms that guarantee jobs (e.g., reliance on private employment, creation of tax incentives, legal regulation of private employers, or public jobs programs) are dimensions of all policy regimes.26 The key issue in investigating states’ effects on gender relations is the extent to which women (or subgroups of women) can claim this right. Of course, paid work exchanges one form of dependence — familial — for another — the dependence on an employer for employment. Classical Marxism argued that women had to be proletarianized as a prelude to their emancipation, which would come to them in their status as workers. However, I am more concerned with the potential of paid work to provide women with some autonomy vis-a-vis marriage (or dependence on parents).

The historical development of decommodification indicates the importance of access to paid work and social benefits. Expanding social rights was an historically-specific strategy of some male-dominated labor movements and their elite (male) allies, as most early social programs — old-age pensions, workmen’s compensation, unemployment insurance, and health insurance — aimed at securing the position of male workers as breadwinners when they were unable to support their families due to loss of jobs or wage-earning capacities (Skocpol and Ritter 1991; Skocpol 1992; Orloff 1993, chaps. 5–9; Jenson 1986; Hennes 1988, pp. 198, 203). Although some labor movements have preferred a “voluntarist” strategy to a strategy based on public provision, the broadly-shared goal of male-dominated cross-class alliances (at least through the first half of the century) was to ensure that participation in paid labor, the marital balance of power, in turn, has implications for both spouses’ current and future earning power, economic well-being, and entitlement to social benefits (Hobson 1990; Quadagno 1988a).

25 Wives’ economic dependence “both reflects labor market realities and reinforces women’s weak position in the labor market” (Hobson 1990, p. 236; Sorenson and McLanahan 1987). Economic dependence is associated with less power within the family because decision-making in marriage is largely based on spouses’ contributions to family income (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; England and Farkas 1986; England and Kilbourne 1990). By affecting decisions about investment in “human capital” and
working-class men could fulfill the role of family provider. This was achieved by improving male workers’ market position, by supplementing men’s wages, and by providing honorable public benefits when work was unavailable. This policy strategy was linked with a “family wage” strategy in the market and was premised on a traditional gender division of labor, that is, women were responsible for domestic and caring work (even if also engaged in paid labor) and men were responsible for providing the bulk of the family income.

The dominant goal of post-World War II workers’ movements has been to extend social rights. Yet labor movements vary in the extent to which they continue to defend the family wage and male family headship. Some working-class movements have changed in response to the increasing numbers of women in their constituencies and have supported anti-discrimination and comparable worth legislation and services such as day care (Ruggie 1984, 1988; Jenson, Hagen, and Reddy 1988; Milkman 1990). Yet in few (if any) instances have such movements embraced an explicit feminist goal of economic independence for women. Rather, their goal usually is to allow married women to combine paid work with family responsibilities — to be secondary earners while continuing to service their husbands (Hernes 1988; Lewis 1992). (Single women may fare somewhat better.)

The Capacity to Form and Maintain an Autonomous Household

The concept of decommodification originated in analyses of class relations and class politics. New categories are needed to deal with the effects of state social provision on gender relations. If individuals who carry out caring and domestic work do not enter the labor market, or enter it only as secondary workers, the resulting distribution of income within the family and the availability of other income sources affects their own and their children’s well-being. Over the last century or so, the “family wage” supplemented by social rights has provided unevenly for wives and children. Feminists often say that women are “a husband away from poverty”; if you’ve got a husband and he shares his income with you, you’re protected, but if not, you’re likely to suffer economically. Most men simply do not share their income with their children after the dissolution of marriage, and states do not make up the difference fully (although there is some cross-national variation in this) (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986; Kamerman 1986; Kahn and Kamerman 1988). Single mothers, who have lower earning capacities relative to men and more responsibility for their children’s well-being, exemplify the economic vulnerabilities of all women — vulnerabilities that are hidden when women have a secure tie to breadwinners. Indeed, the deprived circumstances of single mothers are sometimes an incentive for women to marry (or to not divorce). Moreover, family income is not always shared equally in marriages (Pahl 1983, 1988), and women’s economic dependency is a significant basis for men’s power advantage in families.

If decommodification is important because it frees wage earners from the compulsion of participating in the market, a parallel dimension is needed to indicate the ability of those who do most of the domestic and caring work — almost all women — to form and maintain autonomous households, that is, to survive and support their children without having to marry to gain access to breadwinners’ income.

I see two ways to conceptualize a dimension of social provision that characterizes degrees of family support and the exigencies of marrying. First, a general dimension of self-determination could be developed that would include independence from markets and marriages. Second, proceeding inductively, a dimension based on the demands of women’s movements could be developed, just as decommodification developed from the aims of male-dominated workers’ movements. (This inductive strategy is not innocent of theory, of course, but allows the use of feminists’ suggestions about what may be necessary to emancipate women to further clarify the significance of the demands for which social movements have struggled.) I argue that the appropriate dimension is the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household.27

27 An important aspect of social benefits as they affect the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household is the extent to which they individualize or “familize” recipients (Fraser 1989). For example, the use of household means tests undermines women’s abilities to claim benefits as individuals. Australia’s and Canada’s means-tested assistance programs for the unemployed and the sick
The decommodification dimension could be subsumed under a more generic dimension measuring independence or autonomy, that is, it would indicate individuals’ freedom from compulsion to enter into potentially oppressive relationships in a number of spheres. This dimension would reflect the growing individualization flowing from processes of modernization and state-building, processes that have replaced the networks of mutual duties and responsibilities — and hierarchies — of traditional corporate bodies with direct links between citizens and states. States now offer resources to the different parties in relationships of domination, accommodation, and conflict (e.g., markets, families, and interracial relations). These state-provided resources alter the balance of power in these relations and within the polity. Individuals typically participate in many such relationships. Thus, the role of the state cannot be understood in reference to only one relationship — decommodification vis-à-vis the market cannot ignore gender relations in the family or race relations in communities. The total package of resources available from both public and private sources across social locations must be considered. Attention would shift from dimensions tied to only one set of potentially unequal or oppressive relations to an examination of the combined effects of all programs on individuals in specific politically and socially significant groups.

This solution would meld the concepts of decommodification and access to an independent income (outside of marriage) into a unitary concept of individual independence, or better yet, a concept of self-determination are conditioned jointly on the incomes of both spouses in the case of married couples, which effectively disqualifies the second earner, usually the woman, from benefits when her income is interrupted (Shaver 1983, 1990; Bernier and LaJoie 1986, pp. 105–06). Women’s claims to benefits are also undercut by the “cohabitation rule” (present in many countries’ social assistance programs), which presumes that living or sleeping with a man indicates that he is financially supporting his partner. Whether a family allowance offers an independent income to mothers depends on which parent receives the benefit — feminists had to fight for women’s right to be designated beneficiaries (Pascall 1986, p. 220). Regulations allowing women independent access to benefits and services are more woman-friendly than those that force dependence on household qualification.

within webs of interdependencies (complete individual autonomy does not exist). In the end, I prefer that separate dimensions deal with different social relations, but a single dimension that explicitly considers gender as well as class relations would, I think, be an improvement over the decommodification/social rights dimension alone.

The problem can also also be dealt with inductively and historically by linking the dimensions of the welfare state to social politics and historical agency. A focus on women’s agency in social politics would supplement decommodification with a dimension that taps a goal of women’s movements — the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household (which can be secured in a number of ways). Indeed, women’s movements have pursued two principal strategies to gain economic independence: (1) establishing secure incomes for women who engage in full-time domestic work and caring for their children; and (2) improving access to paid work and establishing services that reduce the burden of caring on individual households (Pateman 1988a). (This further supports the claim that access to paid employment should be considered a dimension of policy regimes.) These strategies have overlapped historically, but the second has emerged as the more important in the “second wave” of feminism. Both strategies would provide women with incomes sufficient to support themselves and their children apart from any claims on breadwinners’ income. Indeed, if successful, these strategies would extend to women rights that are implicitly or explicitly now guaranteed to men (of the dominant race/ethnic group), as in the Italian case where, according to Saraceno (1992, p. 8), men have the right to a family — that is, a man has the right to a job or income that allows him to maintain a wife and children.

The focus on women’s independent income for supporting a household and their choices about (at least potentially oppressive) marriages goes beyond the focus of the power re-

28 Esping-Andersen (1990) noted that “the social-democratic regime’s policy of emancipation addresses both the market and the traditional family . . . the ideal is . . . to maximize . . . capacities for individual independence” (p. 28). However, he did not pursue the implications of independence vis-à-vis the traditional family and how independence might differ from decommodification.
sources analysts on “socializing the costs of familyhood” and “allowing women to choose work.” The capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household relieves women of the compulsion to enter or stay in a marriage because of economic vulnerability (thus paralleling the effects of the citizen’s wage for workers vis-à-vis the market). Following Hirschman (1970), the right of exit — in this case, to be able to choose not to enter or stay in a marriage — alters the power relations within marriages (England and Kilbourne 1990). The state is woman-friendly to the extent that it enhances women’s leverage within marriage (e.g., by reducing domestic violence or imposing domestic obligations on men) or increases the absolute and relative standards of living of woman-maintained families.

Secure incomes for full-time domestic workers. In a “maternalist” strand of welfare politics, women reformers in the first half of the twentieth century proposed state support to widowed or abandoned mothers so they could stay at home to care for their children (Michel and Koven 1990; Skocpol and Ritter 1991; Skocpol 1992). Some reformers also fought for a general “endowment of motherhood” for all mothers, which would confer political recognition on the work of mothering as well as provide an independent income. Pedersen (1989) summarized the argument by British reformers:

Most women . . . would continue to be wives and mothers. The problem was not their role, but the fact that their work . . . was undervalued and underpaid. True equality meant freeing these women from economic dependence on their husbands by granting equal honor and financial support to their work in “women’s sphere.” . . . Labor market reforms would not answer the needs of the unwaged. Only State intervention could do so; welfare programs could circumvent the labor market to provide independent support for mothers. (p. 86)

This general approach did not succeed, except in much shrunken form as children’s allowances, which most states paid to mothers, but which were never sufficient to support a woman without a husband (Pateman 1988a, p. 254). Other benefits and services were restricted to single mothers, usually widows, but sometimes divorced, separated, or unmarried women (e.g., widows’ pensions or survivors’ insurance). Thus, “maternalist” programs came to be primarily a back-up for the “failures” of the family wage system (Gordon 1988a; Skocpol and Ritter 1991; Pedersen 1989). They allowed women and their children to survive without husbands, but in relatively deprived circumstances. Nowhere did a maternalist strategy achieve parity between benefits for stay-at-home mothers and wage earners’ benefits or a standard of living for single mothers comparable to their married counterparts. Feminists and others still debate the extent to which a maternalist strategy — paying women to stay home with their children — is a viable strategy, and this seems to vary cross-nationally.

Increasing work opportunities and shifting domestic responsibilities. Since World War II, and especially since the 1960s, most women’s movements have pursued a goal of equal rights that aims at creating conditions enabling everyone — men and women alike — to be economically independent individuals who can also contribute in part to the support of their children (Freeman 1990). Reformers support policies that enhance women’s access to employment and increase women’s wages and opportunities. Countries vary in whether such opportunities are created through state employment or through state regulation of private employers. In addition, reformers have advocated programs that require fathers or the state to supplement single mothers’ wages with child support funds. Recently, men’s wages have eroded and gender gaps in wages persist, so it has come to seem increasingly unrealistic to expect mothers to earn enough in the market to support themselves and their families.29 (Women usually retain custody when marriages break up or do not form; thus, state support for children is especially, though not exclusively, important for women.) In many countries, majority opinion favors all women working for pay, so the political question is how much help from the state will be available. In Sweden, single mothers receive considerable assistance, whereas in the United States, .

29 Men support families primarily through wages secured in the market, sometimes supplemented by social benefits. Few women can rely solely on market wages to maintain their families because of the demands of family responsibilities and their economic vulnerabilities. In this sense, the greater dependence on states for support among women in the paid labor force as compared to men parallels working-class men’s greater reliance on state support when income is interrupted as compared to middle-class men.

As many feminists have pointed out, tension exists between these two strategies (often understood as protection versus equality). To some extent, these are alternative rather than complementary, although, as Sarvasy (1992) noted in her examination of post-suffrage U.S. feminism, there is at least the possibility for synthesis. Yet by considering the example of working-class strategies and regime-types, it can reasonably be expected that different social policy regimes (including gender, class, and other elements) will be associated with the predominance of different strategies on the part of women’s movements, and the extent and form of “woman-friendliness” can still be assessed.

Back to politics. Going “beyond decommmodification” to consider women’s capacities to form and maintain autonomous households, one critical and problematic issue remains. This is the question of political power. Even if state provision enables individual women to leave oppressive situations, this does not embody a true social right — as opposed to a social benefit or an unintended consequence of backing up the family wage system — if it is not coupled with women’s political participation and power (Hernes 1987, 1988). If women do not participate in policymaking, their concerns are less likely to be reflected in social programs. In this regard, the experience of early women welfare reformers is instructive. The origins of the welfare state were marked by the attempts of feminists and women reformers to valorize caring work and motherhood as a basis for claims to honorable citizenship benefits. Claims based on motherhood were not seen as inferior to claims based on work or “universal” citizenship — they were claims that women’s work, their form of service to the state, entitled them to honorable citizenship benefits (Orloff 1991; Lake 1992). It is a measure of their lack of political power that they were unable to make that understanding dominant. But the struggle over the value of caring work for making claims on the welfare state continues, even if exclusively maternalist welfare politics have been abandoned (Hernes 1987, 1988). Women are politicized and mobilized by their ties to the state, which may in turn give women a greater share of political power and produce a change in policy arrangements. Both material or social rights and participatory or political rights must be considered to fully understand the effects of the welfare state on gender.

CONCLUSION

A gendered version of the power resources analysts’ scheme for assessing social policy regimes would prove a fruitful guide for future research. The state-market relations and stratification dimensions of social provision can be altered to take into account gender hierarchies, power relations within families, and the social organization of caring and domestic labor. Renaming the first dimension — to state-market-family relations — would underline the necessity of accounting for families’ contributions to welfare and the political importance of the family-state division of welfare labor. The name for the second dimension — stratification — is elastic enough to incorporate gender. The social citizenship rights/decommmodification dimension is more problematic. First, citizenship status cannot be considered ungendered; moreover, political and civil rights are not yet fully available to women (e.g., women’s rights to mobilize politically may be undercut due to sexual harassment). Thus, other state activities should be considered, particularly family law and legal practices dealing with civil rights associated with legal personhood and bodily integrity, a critical part of the context of social provision. And, if women do not participate in the formation and administration of policy, social policy for women is unlikely to translate into women’s social citizenship.

Second, the concept of decommmodification does not fully apply to women workers and is misleading concerning the situation of male workers because it ignores who does caring and domestic labor — and who are the beneficiaries of these domestic arrangements. The extent to which citizens have rights to services that socialize this work should be considered.

In order to properly assess states’ effects on gender relations, two new dimensions must be added to supplement the power resources analysts’ original three dimensions. The dimension of access to paid work captures the extent to which women, particularly married women and mothers, are assured employment, a significant source of economic and political power. The dimension of women’s capacity to
power. The dimension of women's capacity to form and maintain autonomous households permits the investigation of the extent of women's freedom from compulsion to enter or stay in marriages in order to obtain economic support.

The initial programs of social provision established across the West in the “formative period of the welfare state” — approximately the 1880s to the onset of World War I — were designed to fit and reinforce the family wage system, with men as breadwinners and women as primary caretakers, domestic workers, and secondary wage earners. Thus, the systems of social provision that emerged from these political struggles can be reasonably referred to as “paternalist” — they bolstered the position of the breadwinning father. The “maternalist” elements of state social provision were by contrast underdeveloped and nowhere did women have equal standing with men. These early social policy initiatives institutionalized aspects of gender relations such as the family wage (in most countries) and the consignment of caring and domestic work to women. Subsequent social policy was heavily influenced by these initial paternalist provisions. They provided the context of constraints and opportunities within which later developments occurred, forming the basis upon which reformers in later periods of welfare reform and restructuring built. Since World War II, expanding those social rights important for full-time, breadwinning workers — mostly men — has been a prominent goal of male-dominated labor movements in the industrialized capitalist countries, paralleling the rise of social-democratic orientations in these movements (Esping-Andersen 1990, pp. 108–10). Changes in the extent of paternalism of the welfare state can be assessed by evaluating (1) the extent to which the state has taken over the provision of welfare services (an aspect of state-family-market relations), (2) the relative treatment of paid and unpaid workers (an aspect of stratification), (3) the bases of people’s claims to services (an aspect of social citizenship rights), (4) women’s access to paid work, and (5) women’s capacities to form and maintain autonomous households.30

As more scholars investigate the content of social policy regimes, a foundation for a more systematic assessment of the effects of state social provision on gender relations and the identification of distinctive gender regimes will emerge. This in turn will focus interest on the causes of variation in the gendered content and effects of state welfare programs. Incorporating new dimensions of social provision that consider gender relations will make research more complicated, and it may entirely “upset the apple cart” — in other words, newly defined gender regimes may not parallel the regimes identifiable by the social rights attached to the status of citizen-worker, the patterning of stratification among dominant-group men, and state-market relations.31

The content of state social provision on gender relations would be interesting in its own right, but would also be relevant for our larger theoretical concerns with the nature of states, capitalism, and male dominance — and the relations among them.

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30 An historical approach could focus on periods when institutions of social provision were in a state of flux — “point[s] where reforms were the live substance of political conflict rather than the dead routines of administrative agencies or the taken for

31 Lewis (1992) recently proposed an alternative to Esping-Andersen’s schema of social policy regimes that resembles my effort. She categorizes regimes by their gender division of work, using the strength of the male breadwinner/ family wage model as a proxy measure. In essence, this combines the dimension of women’s access to work and the dimension of capacity to form and maintain autonomous households. I would argue that these two aspects of the social policy regime should be kept analytically distinct as they are not perfectly correlated, but incorporating the gender division of labor is preferable to ignoring it.
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